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THE PATTERNOF COMPENSATiON
OVER TIME
One approach to ananalysis of the compensation of executives is an
examination of the changes thathave taken place over time in the re-
wards associated with particularpositions within the corporate hici-
archy. For example, we mightfocus on what has happened during the
last quarter century to the amountand form of the remuneration of the
highest-paid executive in each of the fiftysample companies. It would
be relevant to ask such questions as:By how much, on average, have
salaries increased since 1940? Has totalcompensation grown more or
less rapidly? Has the growth been steady overthis period! Which
components of the pay package have beenthe most valuable and most
rapidly growing? These issues will be considered here in terms of the
experience of the top executive in each firm in every year and also for
the combination of all five positions within those firms for which data
were collected. The goat is to determinehow well executives have fared
since the advent both of high personal income taxes and the post-World
War II economic boom and to discover how important rewards other
than salary and bonus have come to be for them (luring this period.
Be/ore-Tax Salaries and Bonuses
We may begin by looking at the most familiar measure of an individuals
rewardshis aggregate before-tax current remuneration consisting of
salary and bonus payments. Table I and ChartI summarize the history
of these payments from 1940 to 1963 for the two categories of execu-
tives. The first column in Table 1 and the upper line in Chart I represent
the average across all fifty companies of the before-tax salary and bonus
122
Sreceived by the highest-paid executive in each firm. The lowerline and
the second column recorda similar series for the full sample of the top
five executives inevery company taken as a group. Thus, in the latter
case, the average current remuneration associated with each of the
highest-paid positionsis computed and then the mean of those five
values obtained.
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The notion of "highest-paid" refers hereonly to salary and bonus.
As was noted earlier, the executivewith the largest amount of such
payments may not necessarily be the best-rewardedone when the rest
of the pay package is takeninto account. For themoment, however,
rankings on the basis ofcurrent remuneration alone provide the data
for the averages compiled.
Those averagesare rather surprising in the modestrates of growth
they suggest. The before-taxcurrent remuneration of the top executive
in each companygrew from an average of about$1 37,000 annually in
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1940 to S210,000 by963. At the same time, the five highest-paidmen
together experienced an increase from slightly betterthan $8 1 000 on
average to approximately $148,500. These changes rcprc's'ntpay raises
of 53 and 83 per cent, respectively, overa period of twenty-four 'ears
certainly not very substantial increases bymost standards.' Between
1940 and 1963 the implied compound annualrates of growth arc only
about 1.8 and 2.5 per cent for the two groups. Thepostwar years look
somewhat better--the corresponding growth rates from 1945on being
closer to 2.1 and 2.9 per cent per annum--but not significantlyso.
Two features of the data are particularly interesting. First, during
World War II annual before-tax current remuneration did not increase
from its prewar level for either category of executives. A mild advance
between 1940 and 1941 is really the only change that is discernible.
This result, of course, can be explained by thewage and salary restraint
imposed by the federal government during the war.
The postwar pattern, on the other hand, isa much less predictable
one: All the growth that took place in the amount of salaries and
bonuses received occurred within the ten years from 1945 to 1955;
after that point both time series effectively level off. In 1963, average
before-tax current remuneration stood at just slightly above its 1955
value iii both cases. During the intervening years some fluctuations can
be observed. One reason for this is that many of the bonuses involved
consisted either of cash payments, which varied in response to the level
of a firm's profits. or of shares of stock whose value changed according
to stock market conditions. Thus. while salaries were seldom reduced,
the bonus component of current remuneration did change from year
to year due in part to external circumstances.2
Even if we take this into consideration, however, it is clear that the
sample executives' direct current rewards did not increase appreciably
from 1955 to 1963. Coupled with the enforced stagnation of the early
1940's, the implication is that whatever growth those rewards displayed
over the last quarter century was compressed into a single ten-year
period.
1For some particularly relevant ones. sec Chapter 9.
2 Variationsalso occur because of normal personnel changeswithinthe
sample.Executivesare continuallyretiringand beingreplaced by younger
men whose salaries may not immediately match those of their predecessors.
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the prewar after-tax figure was reattained and,in1950, a peak of
$83,000 reached. At that point, Korean war tax provisionS took hold,
and,as late as 1953, tIle1spict1 top executive's disposable income froni
salary and bonus stood at almost exactly itsI940level. The only sig-
nificant increase from then onexccpt for a brief flurry in l956oc
curred largely because taxes were eventually reduced. By 1963, average
after-tax current remuneration came to $87,500a gain of just$10,400
since1940,or about 1 3 per cent in twenty-three years.
The story for allfive top executives together is somewhat more
favorable. Their income declined less during the war, grew more sharply
immediately thereafter, and performed marginally better in the 1950's.
The average after-tax salary and bonus of this group in 1963 was ap-
proximately $68,000up from $5 1,000 in1940and a 33 per cent
over-all gain.
As they stand, the figures support the conclusion that is frequently
put forward by spokesmen for the interests of executives, i.e., that high
taxes have made it impossible for such individuals to be rewarded in a
manner comparable to the past because the pretax salary levels neces-
sary to achieve that objective are so great that neither shareholder nor
public opinion will countenance their paymenL On the basis of the data
above, this contention is not surprising. It cannot, however, be accepted
until all the evidence on compensation is in.
Total A frer-Tax Co,npensation
If, instead of considering only current remuneration, we compute the
"after-tax current income equivalents" of the other items in thepay
package as well, a rather different history emerges. Table 3 and Chart
3 record the relevant figures for the men who in eachyear between
1940and 1963 were their firms' highest-paid employees. In this in-
stance, the term "highest-paid" is an accurate designation. The sample
depicted is that in which the executivesare ranked within their firms
See, for cxtrnpte, the testimony in 1955 of the then-president of the DuPont
Company, Mr. Crawford Grecnewalt, in United StatesJoint Committee on the
Economic Report, Federal Tax Policyfor Economic Groitth and Stability:
Hearings Before the Su/'co,n,njttep on Ta.r Policy, 84th Congress,1St Session.
Washington, D.C.. 1955, pp. 137-164.Till.: PATTERN OF (')MPENSATION OVER TIME 129
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according to their total after-tax income,not just their salaries and
bonuses.
Through 1954 the pattern which the datatrace out is gcnerally similar
to the history of after-tax salaries and bonuses.From its 1940 value,
average total compensation fell to a wartime low,rose by about 1948 to
its original level, peaked in 1950,and then recovered in 1954 froma
brief decline caused by Koreanwar taxes. In 1955, however, a sub-
See Chapter 10 for a discussionof variations in executive rankingson the basis of total remunerationvs. salary.
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stantial jump in total after-taxcompensation occurred. The figures there
after, while Il uctuating from year to year,suggest that this increase was
just niaintaincd. In cffcct,tlicsautestagflttioq'' that characterized
salary and bonus payments in the late 1950's andearly 1960's shows
up again, but in the form of income levels significantly higher than those
observed prior to 1955. The result isa much less pessimisticview of the
compensation experience of executivesover time, whether we look only
at the top executive in every company or at all five for whom dataare
available.
The explanation, of course, is one that has been anticipated:a per-
sistent trend toward the use--and iiberalizatjonof forms ofreward
other than salary and bonus. As will be documented in the following
section, all the major supplements to salary have been steadily growing
in value. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the inid-l950's and
appears most strikingly in the remuneration provided by stock options.
Approximately two-thirds of the sharp increase in total after-taxcom-
pensation from 1954 to 1955 is accounted for by suddenly higher stock
option profits arising from the beginnings of the post-Koreanwar stock
market boom.5 The volatility of such profits according to market
conditions also explains most of the fluctuations in total executivecom-
pensation subsequently observcd.
Because of those fluctuations, it seems desirable to smooth the stock
option data over the interval 1955 through 1963. It was not until then,
as we shall see, that options really emerged as a significant item of
remuneration. The volatility of the rewards associated with them, how-
ever, while an important phenomenon, may tend to obscure some of the
longer run trends in levels of earnings that are of interest here. The drop
in the compensation totals recorded in 1963, for example, is a reflection
of the stock market decline of 1962a decline that was soon reversed.7
If 1964 figures were calculated, total compensation would again be
observed to rise. An "average" stock option current income equivalent
for the later years of the study, therefore, should provide a better basis
See below, Table 4 and Chart 5.
' Common-stock-based profit.sharing and defcired compensation plans also
contribute elements of instability in this connection.
The reduced value of option profits shows up with a lag since the valuation
techniques employed adjust the relevant current income equivalents only after
"reading" the closing market price of the previous year. See Chapter 4.I
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TOP FIVE EXECUTIVES
for identifying increases in remunerationover a long period of time
than would choosingany single one of those years as a standard. The
result of such averagingappears in Chart 4 for both compensation
series, the remaining fluctuations beingdue to the other items in the pay
package.8
One question which hasa bearing on the validity of this procedure is
whether the experience ofexecutives with stock options between 1955
8 Average after-tax stockoption profitsfor the top cxccutives in eachIrm Irons 195$ through 1963 were $74,K97per annum. For the op five men, the figure is $34,261.
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the results summarized in ChartsIand 2, a further coiiclusion isi
dicated (which will be made clearer inthe next section by a breakdown
of the pay package into itcompoflCflts ) :The introduction of sizeal)le
supplements to salary, especially stockoptions. in the postwar Period
accounted for virtually all the increasein the compensation of top
executives during the last quarter century.The slowlyrising pretax
salaries and bonuses seen in Chart I just aboutoffset the effect of higher
income taxes and would, by themselves, have leftexecutives little better
off in terms of after-tax income than they werein 1940.
Because such supplements did appear, however, our assessment of the
pattern of executive rewards over time is rather more favorable than
that which after-tax current remuneration alone would suggest. The
average annual total after-tax compensationenjoyed by the top executive
in each firm in the sample during the period 1955 through 1963 comes
to $210,663. If that is used as a terminal figure, total remuneration
turns out to have grown at an annual rate of approximately 3.2 per
cent between 1940 and 1963. Up until l955the corresponding rate
was 4.8 per cent. If only the interval between the war-induced low of
1945 and the plateau reached in 1955 is considered, an annual rate of
fully 12.3 per cent is observed. For allfive top executives together,
average after-tax remuneration from 1955 to 1963 was $128,940 per
annum, and the implied compound annual rates of growth over the
three periods indicated were a very similar 3.3, 5.1 and 11.4 per cent,
respectively.
A final comment is in order. If we return to the unsmoothed history
of Chart 3, it is evident that the aggregate value of the senior corporate
executive's compensation package was much more volatile from one
year to the next in the later years of the study than it was in the 1940s
and early 1950's. It is also true that this volatility is a direct consequence
of the manner in which the valuation techniques developed above
operate on executives' experiences with stock options and other com-
mon stock-oriented rewards. However, the current income equivalents
which those techniques generate are regarded here, andwere presented
earlier, as both accurate and appropriate reflections of the pattern of
compensation which is in fact realized by executives. Thus, if the price
of a firm's common stock on the market should fall sharply, those in-dividuals holding options to purchase that stock have thereby suffered
a diminutionof their existing CCOnOIThC positions just as surely as if the'
already owned the shares involved. It therefore is necessary to recognize
this decline as wlI as any subsequent gctins in the current ilicuirie
equivalent of an option.° Accordingly, the fluctuations in total com-
pensation depicted are real ones, and they identify a trend which could
have important implications.
The issue is frequently raised that corporate executives may not he
properly responsive to the welfare of their firms' shareholders now that
the era of the owner-manager is past. One answer to such a concern is
to point out the sizeable amountsof stock in their companies which,
as proxy statementsrecord, almost all senior executives in large firms
hold. Even though such holdings seldom approach anything likea
majority interest, for many men they are likely to represent a large per-
centage of their personal investment portfolios. Therefore, whatever
effect on their behavior an ownership position might be thought of as
having, it should be just about as strong tinder these circumstances as
it was in the days before the professional managerappeared. The
tendency in recent years to design portions of the compensationpackage
around the firm's common stockand the results of this policy as
evidenced by the increasing variability of rewardsreinforcesthe tie-in
of ownership and management. If a man's remunerationeach year is
highly sensitive to what happens to the price ofhis firm's stock, his
interest in that price and in the economic well-beingof his fellow share-
holders cannot help but be intensified. The fact thatexecutive com-
pensation now does in part duplicate the consequences ofownership
and the extent to which those consequences are felt bythe individuals
involved isvell illustrated by Chart 3.
Composition of the Package: To!) Executive
Separation of total after-tax remunerationinto its components high-
lights and further documents the conclusionsoffered above. Consider
first the experience since 1940 of thehighest-paid executive in each
That equivalent stream of payments has, as wasnoted earlier, some built-in
smoothing of widely varying stoctprices, which helps modify suchsituations
when they do occur.
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firm as itis presented in Table 4 and in Charts 5 through712From
these data, one development very quickly enicrgcs----thctraditional
salary and bonus payments no longer constitute the bulk 01 top eccu-
tives' compensation. Of the total after-tax rewards received by such
men during the ten years from 1940 throughI 949, 72 per cent was in
the form of salary and bonus. In the nine-year interval l)Cginrling in
1955, the corresponding figure was only 38 per cent. In fact, for this
sample the absolute level of after-tax direct current remuneration has
been very little higher since 1955 than it was in either 1940 or the post.
war peak year of 1950. This situation coincides with that depicted
previously (Chart 2) for the highest-salaried individuals in thesame
firms. Clearly, corporations have come to rely much more heavilyon
noncurrentand less severely taxedfornis of reward for men whoare
to be compensated at very high levels. The degree to which the emphasis
has shifted since the 1940's is nonetheless rather surprising and strongly
indicates the inappropriateness of considering only salary and bonusin
any discussion of executive rewards.
A second conclusion which the data suggest is alsoone which, a
priori, might not have been anticipated: pensions have becomeless
important in the pay package over theyears. From 1940 through 1949
their current income equivalents amountedto 26 per cent of all com-
pensation, but since 1955 the percentage has droppedto 15. It is not
that pensions in themselvesare less valuable than they used to be; the
average annual current equivalents for the two periodsare approxi-
mately $20,000 and $31,000, respectively.Itisrather that stock
options, deferred compensation, andprofit-sharing plans have grown
in value much more rapidly. Inrelation to after-tax salary and bonus
alone, pensions have been somewhatlarger in recent years than they
were in the 1940's-39 per cent vs. 36per centbut the changes in
the other majorcomponents of the pay package which have taken place
over time have appreciably diminished therole which pensions play in
the over-all structure of rewards.
The pattern of thecurrent income equivalents over the relevant
interval is worth noting. Severalpeaks in the figurescan be detected:
12In these tabulations, thecurrent income equivalents of deferredcompensa- tion and profit-sharing plansare combined in order to reduce the number of categories of compensation thatare recorded and make the various tables and charts easier to read, Noimportant conclusionsare obscured by this simplifica- tion, and it will therefore bemaintained in succeeding sectionsas well.
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in 1940 and 1941, in 1944 and 1945, inI Y5(). and in1955 tllrOlLgh
1957. In each case these peaks coincide with a wave either of penjop
plan adoptions by the sample corporations or ot liberatizations in the
benefit formulas of plans already in effect. Thus, in the early 1940's most
firms were introducing pensions for the fIrst time. Late in World War
11 a second major surge of adoptions occurred. This was followed in
many companies by two rounds of benefit increases, sonic of which took
the form of adding a second and separate pension plan to the existing
one, in the early and middle 1950's. It should he noted that the 1944
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and 1945 pension current equivalentfigures appear less significant than
they really arc in this connection.Just as many of the pensionsadopted
during those years were reactions tothe wartime ceiling on other re-
wards and to the high tax rates thenin effect, so the pensions them-
selves were less valuable in after-tax termsbecause of the impact of the
same tax rates on theexpected postretirement income theywould pro-
vide.The other concentrations ofadoptions and benefit increasestook
place under less constrained circumstances.
1 The assumption throughout the computations,it will he recalled, is that the
tax rates of the year for which currentincome equivalents are beingdetermined
are expected by theexecutives under consideratIon tocontinue indefinitely. The
appropriateness of an assumption ofthis sort is perhaps most open toquestion
under high wartime tax conditions.The speculationsnecessary tojustifya
different set of expectations on thepart of the relevantindividuals, however,
strongly favored maintaining that assumptionin every year.140 EXF('(rT1VF('OM PENSATION



















l'he fact that the resulting pension history is inconsequence a series
of cycles around a trend rather thana continually rising function is ex-
plained by a phenomenon whichwas pointed out earlier in the numerical
example in Chapter 6. If an executive shouldhappen to he awarded a
pension for the first timcor shouldhappen to enjoy a substantial in-
crease in the benefits promised himina year when he is nearing re-
tirenient age, the current incomeequivalent of that promise is quite
large. Therefore, each timewe observe a wave of new pension plansor
benefit improvements, the olderexecutives in the sample contribute im-
mediately a very sizeable increaseto the aggregate pension currentTHE PATTERN OF COMPENSATION OVER TI1E 141
equivalent Ilguies. Those executives then retire after several years, and
the inclusion of their younger replacements in the sample brings the
averages back down again, since the effect of a pension change on the
latter's annual current equivalents is not so pronounced.'4 All five top
executives taken together present a greater range of ages and circum-
stances, and the variations over time in the pension figures for that
group are somewhat more modest, as we shall see. In any event, while
peaks in the pension data are valid symptoms of changes in retirement
benefit promises, averages over a span of years are better bases from
which to draw conclusions about secular trends.
Table 4 and the accompanying charts make evident the growing
significance of deferred compensation, profit-sharing, and stock option
plans. For all intents and purposes, none of these devices appeared in
the compensation package until after World War II. Even as late as
1951 they accounted for just 9 per cent of the total after-tax annual
compensation received by the sample executives. Since 1955, however,
they have emerged as major elements in the reward structure, generating
fully 47 per cent of the remuneration realized in the final nine years of
the study. Stock options alone provided 36 per cent of the total and
were. in fact, as important a form of reward as salaryand bonus during
that period. If we look at Chart 5, it sccms fair to conclude that the
introduction and expanded utilization of these three instruments were
the only real sources of growth in top executive compensation overthe
last quarter century. Salaries, bonuses, and pension benefits combined
just about kept pace with the personal income tax increasesexperienced
since the early 1940's and would alone have done little more than pre-
serve the pre-World War 11 level ofmanagerial remuneration.
The key attribute of the newer deferred and contingentrewards is,
of course, their volatility. This characteristic shows upquite explicitly,
especially in Chart 6, when the pay package is dissected, but itsimplica-
tions have already been explored and need not bere-examined. Atten-
tion should, however, be called to the fact that we now seethat ap-
proximately half of the typical top executive's totalremuneration in
recent years consisted of essentiallyownership-oriented rewards. What-
ever the behavioral consequences of anownership attitude may be, they
A siniTarsituation was noted in connection with average salarydata.142 EXECUTIVE ('OM P E NSAT ION
certainly should he encouraged ha compensation framework weighted
this heavily in thc direction of such devices.The same \vciehting also
has implications in terms of effective tax progression. Since capital gains
rates apply to the income generate(l by mostof these arrangements, it
is clear that on1' a slight majorityofthe after-tax rewards enjoyed by
corporate chief executives nowadays come from sources subject to the
high niarginal rates of the statutory personal income tax schedule.
Corn positionof 1/u' Package: Top Five Executives
The collective experienceofthe five highest-paid executives in each
firm in the sample is generally similar, asis shown by Table 5 and
Charts 8 through1 0. Total after-tax compensation grew at about the
same rate as in the caseoftop executives, but current remuneration ac-
counted for a greater share of the growth. This result is consistent with
the finding above that the salaries and bonuses of successively lower-
ranking individuals increased more rapidly over time (see Charts I and
2). Thus, even though the supplements to direct current remuneration
introduced in the postwar period have become an important part of
every executive's pay package. traditional rewards play a larger role
the lower the over-all level of compensation in question.
This pattern is evident in all the computations. The aggregate after-
tax remuneration received during the period 1955 through 1963 by the
individuals included in Table 5 breaks down as follows:
This compares with the corresponding figures fortop executives:
Per Cent
Salary and bonus 52
Pension 13
Deferred compensation and profit-sharing 8
Stock options 27
Per Cent
Salary and bonus 38
Pension 15
Deferred compensation and profit-sharing 11
Stock options 36THE PATTERN OF COMPENSATiON OVER TIME 143
IABLE 5
Elements of After-Tax Compensation, Top Five Executives. 1940-63
(dollars)











1940 59.74051,044 (85)8,627 (iS) 32(0) 37(0)
1941 56,88544,039 (78)12732 (22) 4!(0) 73(0)
1942 44,37536.390 (82)7,923 (18) 54(0) 8(0)
1943 38,91331,550 (81)7,309 (19) 54(0)- (0)
1944 41.87331,389 (75)10,432 (25) 520) -- (0)
1945 41,32931.S80 (77)9.667 (23) 82(0)- (0)
1946 47,87838,055 (80)9.141 (19) 682(I)- (0)
1947 49,98938.851 (78)10,455 (21) 680(I) 3(0)
1948 67,44455,636 (83)10,677 (16) 916(I) 215(0)
1949 70,82557.433 (8!)10.667 (15)2.476(4) 249(0)
1950 79,01160,266 (76)14.970 (19)3.073(4) 702(1)
1951 77,31659,104 (76)13,943 (18)1,406(2)2,863(4)
1952 79.45056,783 (72)12,826 (16)2.459(3)7,382(9)
1953 86.18159,214 (69)13.993 (16)3.131(4)9.843 (II)
1954 93,07664,135 (69)13,519 (15)5.929(6)9.493 (10)
1955 125,20466.058 (53)23,274 (18)5.028(4)30.844 (25)
1956 136,96068,009 (50)19,045 (14)8,215(6)41,691 (30)
1957 133.31567.430 (51)19.807 (15)9.954(7)36.124 (27)
1958 109,33565,778 (60)16,964 (IS)8,461(8)18.132 (17)
1959 131,24766.924 (5!)16.583 (13)11,494(9)36.246 (27)
1960 133,24965.971 (49)15,447 (12)11,899(9)39,932 (30)
1961 131,36165.295 (50)12,944 (10)16,640 (13)36,482 (28)
1962 138.75467,052 (48)16,112 (12)12.828(9)42,762 (31)
1963 121,03968.883 (57)13.922 (II)12,099 (tO)26,135 (22)
Averages:
1940-49 51.92541,597 (80,9,763 (19) 507(Ii 58(0)
1955-63128,94066.822 (52)17.122 (13)10.735(8)34,261 (27)Ir
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More interesting at the moment, however, is the fact that thesame
pronounced shift toward ownership-oriented rewardsandaway from
salary and bonushas taken place for thesemen as well. From 1940
to 1949, stock options, deferred compensation, and profit-sharing plans
together provided only about 1per cent of all their after-tax compensa-
tion. Pensions supplied 19per cent, and the remainder was due to
salary and bonus.'Regardless of which groupwe choose to consider,
Once again, pensions turn out to have diminishedin relative importance
over the years. not because of a reduction in their absolutevalue but because
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CHART 9
Items of A fter 1 ax (on :pensation, Top Five
Executives, 1940-63
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therefore. the historical patterns tell a consistent story. The composition
of the pay package has changed significantly over time; it has become
more volatile in the process; and its growth in after-tax value is, by and
large, a result of innovations in reward.
Before-Tax Current Equivalents
Examination of the before-tax current income equivalents of the various
supplements to salary and bonus sharpens these assertions and shows
very clearly the impact on executive remuneration of both high ordinary-
SALARY AND 8ONUS146 EXECUTIVE COM PENSATION
After-Tax Compensation Breakc1i'n, 'lop l"ive L'xecutives

























income tax rates and the tax-ameliorating capacityof deferred and
contingent arrangements. A computationwas made of the amount of
before-tax salary and: or bonus that would havebeen necessary in each
year to provide an individual with the level of total after-taxincome
indicated by the averages obtained abovefor the five executive positions
studied. Time series like thoseconstructed for after-tax remuneration
were then derived and are presented in Tables6 and 7 and in Charts
11 through 14.
For example, the questionwas asked: How much in the way of
60 63THE PATTERN OF COMPENSATIONOVER TIME 147
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Sharing Stock Options Total
1940 131.364 (6.5)69.852 (35) 450(0)- (0)201,666
1941 138,71 I(62)85.518 (38) 703(0) 330(0) 225,262
1942 132,679 (53)113,320 (46) 1.919 l)- (0) 247.919
1943 137,631 (38)217.240 (61) 4,194(I)- (0) 359,065
1944 133.399 (27)348.033 (72) 4,170(1)- (01485603
1945 130,063 (28)321.898 (71) 4.786(I) (0)456.746
1946 128.263 (47)134,43! (49)10.804(4)- (0)173497
1947 140.486 (42)174.928 (52)19.340(ó)- (0) 334.754
1948 147.436 (58)9 1.298 (36)12.368(5) 3.681(lI 254.783
1949 157.589 (56)82.8 17 (30)32,847 (12) 4.731(2)277.984
1950 145,900 (43)139.897 (41)44.393 (13) 11.113(3) 341.304
1951 158.164 (33)226.915 (47)20,754(4) 74.281 (16) 480,115
1952 164.667 (25)248.516 (38)41.550(6)204.885 (31) 659,618
1953 168,893 (20)294.087 (35)80.0019)298.892 (36)841.874
1954 170,712 (20)275.356 (33)129.954 (15)265.761 (32)841.784
1955 174,647 (II)503,084 (31)145,192(9)801.719 (4911,624.642
1956 181.182 (10)415.434 (22)210,233 (11)1.044.585 (57)1.851,434
1957 179,045 (10)428,970 (24)253,800 (IS)898.814 (51)1.760.629
1958 179,916 (16)335.063 (30)206,519 (18)395.764 (36)1.117.262
1959 184,053 (12)342.546 (22)234.514 (IS)812.640 (51)1.573.752
1960 177.517 (lO)308.421 (18)232.197 (14)983.349 (58)1,701.484
1961 177.510 (12)206.397 (14)363.963 (241 759,868 (50)1.507.738
1962 173.367 (10)287.262 (16)348.162 (20)934.732 (54)1.743.523
1963 187.517 (14)200,740 (15)293.713 (23)622.630 (48)1.304,599
Average:
1955-63179,417 (12)336,435 (21)254.255 (16)806.011 (51)1,576.118
NotE: Figures in parentheses denote percentages of total each year.
before-tax salary and bonus would have been requiredin1963 to
generate for an individual the $1 87,279 in aggregateafter-tax corn-
perisation that was, on average, enjoyed by thehighest-paid executive in
each sample company? The difference between thatfigure and the actual




Fiticir.ircuh detj'trL'ruI,tC-. P44.44 \
represent\ the combined before-taxcurrent income equivalent of their
deferred and contjnefltrewards, and can he apportionedamong pen-
sions, stock 0Ptioii, and deferredCompensation :oceordinIi) the pro-
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1956 P8.62?ITh184.100234 82.651lot409.75$
(5)1814.831
195 136.818184 159.81(2 4244 98,946I Pt153 423454 $.99I l9$ 132.141-.254151.226 29 9.590ISP (12.61531) 525.61(4
1959 PSS.jII1$)l5.4320 112.1451St351.957 4t 591(O
1960 P2.894 45.l6'419t 112.1-4-I44'Q2 '"l)
19(11












13S.224I$t 61(436 7ThII(4,6$4 14t 1h' .1THE PATTERN OF COM PENSAT1ON OVER TIME 149
year and for all live top executiVe positions. As before, the stock option
data vrsmoothed over the periodI 955-63 in the charts in order to
aid the identification of tiends.
We see from Chart ii that the time pattern of the before-tax current
equivalents resembles that of total after-tax compensation (Chart 4)
hut that each change in the figures is accentuated because of the impact
of progressive tax rates. In 1940 the typical top executiv&s entire com-
pensation package was worth to him, in terms of pretax salary. $201,-
700. For the top five as a group, the figure was $99,000. By 1955, and
continuing thereafter through 1963. these values had increased to ap-
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proximately $1,576,000 and$734,000, respectively. Ineffect, a per
capita annual salary ofover a million and a half dollarswould have been
necessary in recent years had thecorporations in the sample attempted
to reward their highest-paidexecutives as well by salary aloneas they
were in fact rewarded by allthe variousarrangements employed.This
alternative would haverequired a level of salaryabout eight times the
'Stock options themselveswere worth the equivalent ofover $800.000 per year in pretax salarypayments.
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amount actually paid. In the case of the five highest-paid men together,
the figure is approximately five times actual salary)
The greater significance of deferred and contingent rewards for top
executives as compared with the average for the top five shows up
again in these before-tax computations. Actual salary and bonus con-
stitute only about 12 per cent of the before-tax total calculated for the
Itshould be pointed outthatifthe lower personaltaxrate schedule
adopted by Congress in 1964 were the applicable one, somewhat smaller total
before-tax payments would generate the same levels of after-tax reward. As an
offset, of course, the after-tax figures themselves would be higher to begin with
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years 1955 through 1963 for thehighest-paid man in each firm,but come to1 8 per cent for all fivecombined.
In certainrespects other than iiitheir volatility, however,the be-
havior of the before-taxcurrent equivalents over time doesdiffer from
that of their after-taxcounterparts, The large jump incompensation in
1955 and the maintenanceof the new levelare again observed, but the
World War II andKorean waryears do not follow the previouspat- tern, The before-taxcurrent equivalent of thetotal pay package in both periodsriscs-_--andas it turns out, for thesame I'cason that the
after-tax figures fell,Even though after-taxcon1pe1sLtion declined underTHE PATTERN OF COMPENSATION OVER TIME 153
the press of higher tax rates, thosc tax rates also created a situation in
which the aniOuflt of salary that would have been necessary to substitute
for the relevant noncurrent rewards went up even more. In 1944 and
1945, for example, the wave of pension plan a(Ioptions mentioned above
did not generate as much in the way of equivalent after-tax earnings as it
would have in the presence o lower taxes, but the resultsweresuf-
ficient to cause the before-tax equivalents of all pensions to triple within
the space of two years, thereby raising significantly the before-tax cur-
rent income value of the whole package. The same phenomenon recurs
during the Korean var, the impetus in that instance coming primarily
from increasesin stock option, deferred compensation, and profit-
sharing benefits.
These computations point up very dramatically the extent to which
the introduction of new types of compensation subject to less severe
tax treatment has allowed the heavy burden on direct current payments
to be circumvented by corporations. Clearly, had such arrangements
not been available, the extremely high salary levelsrequired to duplicate
the remuneration thereby provided would not have been forthcoming.
Executives, in consequence, would not have been anywhere near as well
rewarded as they actually were. If we want to speak of the"impact" of
taxes on the compensation of top corporateexecutives, then, the before-
tax current equivalent time series derivedhere permit two significant
and hitherto undocumentedconclusions: (1)had they been applied
to all forms of reward. the steeply progressivepersonal tax rates of the
post-World War II period would almost certainly haveprevented any
substantial growth in after--tax executive remunerationsince1 940; and
(2) the tax "loopholes" which pensions, stock options,and other de-
ferred and contingent rewards represent havemade possible levels of
compensation that in recent years were equivalent in value tosalary and
bonus payments five to eight times as large asthose actually paid.
Sumniarv and Comments
The average annual before-tax salaries andbonuses associated with
the five highest-paid executive positions inthe nations largest manu-
facturing corporations have increased b83 per cent over the last
quarter century. For the top executivein each firm alone, the increase154 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
amounted to 53 per cent. Recause of a rise in personal tax rates during
the same interval, howcvcr. the corresponding after-tax incrcmen[come
to only 33 and 13 per cent, respectively. As might be anticipated,a
more favorable historical pattern emerges when the values of the major
supplements to direct current remuneration arc included in the com-
parisons. The total after-tax compensation of the executives in the
sample has approximately doubled since 1940, implying a compound
rate of growth of slightly in excess of 3 per cent per annum. The latter
figure, while a substantial improvement on the I per cent or so suggested
by after-tax salaries and bonuses, is still quite modest.
The growth in compensation levels which did occur was confined
entirely to the ten years immediately following World War 11. From
1940 to 1945 total after-tax top executive pay declined steadily,and
since 1955 has exhibited no appeciable upward trend.Significantly,
virtually all the observed increase in earnings is attributable to thein-
troduction of new forms of reward rather than toan expanded utiliza-
tion of traditional ones. Stock options in particular have beena key
item, providing between 25 and 40 per cent of observedaggregate after-
tax remuneration over the last decade. The importance of developing
techniques for evaluating all the components of thepay package is
underscored by these findings. Salary and bonus aloneare no longer suf-
ficient guides to executives' compensation circumstances.In fact, in
terms of before-tax current income equivalents, other devices havebeen
worth from four to seven timesas much as actual salary and bonus in
recent years.
A concomitant of this shift in emphasisaway from direct current re-
muneration has been an increase in theyear-to-year variability of the
value of the compensation package.Since many of the newer rewards
utilize shares of the employercorporation's common stock as the com-
pensation medium, changes in marketprices have come to exert a strong
influence on top executives' earnings.It is not unlikely, therefore, that
a greater degree of managerial identificationwith shareholder interests
has been encouraged by thesearrangements_a result which prevailing
sentiment would applaud.
The substantial increase inpersonal income tax rates experienced
since 1940 has not only contributedto the slow rate of growth of top
executives' after-tax rewards buthas obviously provided much of theTHE PATTERN OF COMPENSATION OVER TIME 155
irripetus for the wider use of the other compensation instruments de-
scribed. Stock options, profit-sharing plans, pensions, and deferred-pay
contracts have all been accorded differentially better tax treatment than
salary and bonus, and the discovery that they have relegated the latter
to a less important compensatory role thaniiithe pastis not sur-
prising. What is surprising, however, is the degree to which this has
occurred. Nowadays, salary and bonus are not merely less important
rewards than before, they are actually minority components of the
total pay package for most top executives. It seems fair to conclude that
part of this change must have resulted from the favorable stock market
conditions of the 1950's and early 1960's rather than from tax consid-
erations alone. Deferred and contingent compensation arrangements
would have been much less attractive, and almost certainly have been
relied on much less heavily, had they not held out the possibility of
very large profits as well as very low taxes. This suggests that if the
stock market experience of the last ten or fifteen years is considered
unlikely to continue, some revival of direct cash payments can be ex-
pected in the near future .A similar line of reasoning also suggests that
the same stock market conditions may be at least partially responsible
for the lack of growth in salaries and bonuses observed since 1955. The
large profits realized by executives from options and other stock-based
instruments could well have made increases in direct payments unnec-
essary in many firms because the levels of rewarddesired for top man-
agement were being attained without those increases.
A second possible explanation for the recent popularity of supple-
ments to current remuneration is their comparativeobscurity. While
salary and bonus awards to executives are easily understood and can
readily be appraised by shareholders when reported on in a firm's proxy
statements, the same is not true of other compensationarrangements.
By their nature they require for understanding both an informedand
a persistent analysis from year to year.Few shareholders are equipped
for such an effort, and even fewer are likely to be inclined to pursueit.
Thus, a firm that wanted to reward its top executiveshandsomely but
preferred not to advertise the fact might well seek to do soin large
part by means other than salary and bonus.The extent to which a
desire for concealment is a factor in corporatecompensation policy is,
of course, pure speculation here. Nonetheless, sincethe opportunity toL56 EXECUTIVE COMPENSAT ION
conc,l does exist. it would he surprisine ifit were not taken advantac
of somewhere alone the line.
Finally, a careful approach to financial planning would, in many
cases, logicall' result in a decision to utilize certain deferred and con-
tinent rewards more exteusivel. l'or a given level of executive re-
niuneration. it may simplY be cheaper front the corporation's standpoint
to grant a stock option, for example. than a salary increase. Or, because
group annuity contract premium rates are lower than those on individual
policies, a company can probably provide retirement income forits
employees at a lower cost than that involved in raising their wages and
salaries enough to let them make equivalent arrangements on theirown.
Liquidity constraints could be persuasive in leading certain firms to
prefer the postponement of payments permitted ba deferred conipensa-
non plan to the immediate cash drain of a salary increase)In short.
for an one of several good reasons, it ma\' be more eflicient fora firm
to utilize forms of reward other than salary and bonus rather exten-
sively. The availability of a wide range of alternative instruments in
the postwar period and the concurrent development of improved tech-
niques of financial nianagernent could very well have encouraged the
sort of restructuring of the executive pay package observed above.
The evidence presented here, then, providesa comprehensive his-
torical profile of the size and composition of the remuneration accruing
to top executives in large manufacturing firms. It is hoped that the data
generated are not only valuable in themselves but will contributeto
further research in this area by castingup the compensation transaction
in a way that allows more meaningfulstatements about its development
and characteristics than have previously been possible.
'On the other hand,itmust he pointed out thatitisalsopossible that
subterfugeofthe kind darklyand perhaps unfairly--hintedat here may be
discouraged in some cases by itsvery effectiveness.If the executiveswhoare
to he the beneficiaries of such a policy donot themselves fully understand or
appreciate the value of the various supplements to salary theyare to he awarded, thereislittle to he gained by the eniplovercorporation in attemptingtotrade
oftsuch rewards against salary in thecompensation package.
Of course, the execittives involved_partic,ilarlvYounger onesmay have
!iquidits constraints of theirown which create counterpressures in this respect.
For the individuals in thecurrent sample, however, thisisnot apt to he a problem.
In connection with this possibility,the Costs of various deferred and con-
tingent compensation arrangementsare compared\Sith the costs of their current
income equivalents in some detail in .AppendixNI.